

Exacting Certitudes: Ethnicity, Fundamentalism and Restorationism in Postmodernity

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Abstract

The thinking of many was that ethnicity and nationalism would come to an end and that the process of modernisation and nationalism would lead to a decline of intercultural differences and bitterness. This, however, is not the case due to the ascendancy of postmodernity and its consequent cultural turmoil which have brought unprecedented emergence of nationalism and ethnicity. The result of all these is that after the millions of death during the Second World War, up to 25 million people have been killed by their own governments, in internal conflicts and ethnic, nationalist, or religious violence. The enterprise of this paper is to find out the reasons for the non-realisation of the lofty dreams of the elimination of violence in the world. With a combination of historical, survey and analytical methods, the paper discovers that robbed of their secure traditions of orthodoxy and their identities crumbling under the influence of post modernism and globalisation, some are prepared to use intimidating tactics and terrorism to live their miserable lives under the jackboot of ethnicity, and fundamentalism in postmodernity. The conclusion is that ethnicity, fundamentalism and accompanying violence are endemic in present day society and that the blood of ethnicity is thicker than the blood of dialogue and peace and ethnicity will not go away in a hurry as long as the desire to protect one's identity and ethnic nationality is more than the desire for mutual coexistence.

Key Words: Ethnicity, Violence, Fundamentalism, Restorationism, Postmodernity

Introduction

Many people hoped that ethnicity and nationalism would cease to exist. This was informed by the fact that the process of modernisation would lead to the decline of intercultural differences and bitterness. However, this has not been the case. The rise of postmodernity and its consequent cultural turmoil have brought tremendous resurgence of nationalism and ethnicity, and increased demands for multiculturalism have destroyed this unrealistic dream. Research reports show that since the end of the Second World War, some 25 million people have been killed; mostly civilians, by their own governments, in internal conflicts and ethnic, nationalist, or religious violence (Arbuckle 2004), and Nigeria has had a fair share of this in the late 1960s during the ethnic conflict (Ekanem 2015).

The thinking was that cultures would be able to assimilate, but unfortunately, this was not the case. Rather, culture is separated by chasms of mutual distrust and ethnic cleansing. For Arbuckle (2004), the fall of communism and the subsequent disintegration of Communist states are further reminders that ethnicity has persisted. Indeed globalisation rather than causing a

bland monocultural world is a catalyst for the revitalisation of ethnicity as well as for the dramatic rise of fundamentalism and cults.

Contemporary ethnicity, nationalism and New Religious Movements that are ravaging the world have one common quality: They are “pro-order” movements. Followers see their world of secure traditions and identities crumbling under the influence of postmodernism, globalisation, and “trendy” innovators. Feeling lost, they again seek the security of clearly defined certitudes. Some are prepared to use intimidating tactics, including terrorism in the case of some fundamentalist movements like the Boko Haram in Nigeria to get what they want (Jamiu and Solahudeen (2018).

The enterprise of this paper therefore is to examine these movements. A better way to go about it is to first delineate the various types of Ethnicity and Violence (Arbuckle 2004). Ethnicity is of different shapes and colours in the world and we will discuss only a few of them.

Types of Ethnicity and Violence

Involuntary or Ascribed Ethnicity

This type of ethnicity is what is known as ethnocentrism. The identity of an ascribed group is called an involuntary or ascribed ethnicity; there is little or no escape from this negative labeling and oppression (Arbuckle 2003). In cases of ascribed ethnicity, the us/them dichotomy present in ethnic relations is especially strong. The dominant group (“us”), often out of a sense of fear of losing their position of power, pejoratively stereotypes a group (“them”) and institutionalizes that oppression. In key areas of life, e.g. employment, education, social relationships, the oppressed are excluded from equality with the dominant group (2006). In Nigeria this is vividly demonstrated in recent appointments key public positions which favour one ethnic group to the detriment of others. To develop and legitimise this discrimination the in-group (Gotan 2006) frequently brands the out-group as racially or culturally inferior, e.g. blacks in South Africa.

Voluntary Ethnicity

This brand of ethnicity emerged in the 1960s among Afro Americans in the United States who demanded respect for their history and origins. There developed what Arbuckle (2004) calls “voluntary,” “symbolic,” “defensive,” or “backlash” ethnicity among whites. Protests of self-righteous indignation continue, especially as economic conditions worsened and competition for employment intensifies. In consequence of the defensive ethnicity there are demands for university programmes in such areas as Irish, Jewish and Polish studies. Similar but less strong backlash movements are to be found in countries whose governments have been fostering alternative action programmes for minorities. Thus voluntary ethnicity means defining one’s identity more precisely by asserting their ancestral right to their power position in society. For example, the ethnicity of whites of European ancestry does not restrict their choice of a spouse, suburb, or friends, or restrict their access to employment and political opportunities.

Migratory Supportive Ethnicity

Report shows that in 1997 almost ninety million people were estimated to be living outside their country of birth and of these, around seventy five million are international migrant workers and their dependants (Stalker 2001). Tragically, migrant workers of whatever sex or nationality are easily exploited (see *The Economist*, 10th September 1988, pp 25-8). The

loneliness and exploitation that migrants experience in a foreign land encourages them to develop a supportive ethnicity amongst themselves (Schiller 1999).

Separatist Ethnicity

In the 1940s some Afro-Americans preached separatism because they became convinced that the dominant political system could not be justly changed in their favour. Thus Malcolm X of the Black Muslims could bitterly remark on the need for blacks to go it alone. “It is not necessary to change the white man’s mind: We have to change our own mind” (Arbuckle 1993: 6).

The Parti Quebecois political movement in Quebec Province, Canada, believes that their French-speaking identity is threatened by the Anglo-phone majority in Canada and only political separation will provide protection. At the same time, non-francophone speakers in Quebec complain that they are objects of Cultural bullying because the emphasis on the French language is excessive and discriminatory (Eller 1999).

Racist or Hate Ethnicity

Research report shows that since 1945 millions of people from the Third World have migrated to the Western countries, usually in search of work. According to Arbuckle (2004), there are 7.3 million foreigners in Germany together with another four million ethnic Germans of foreign origin, many of whom did not speak German when they arrived. Consequently, powerful, often vociferous, movements have developed against these immigrants and other minority groups. Even though these movements could be termed voluntary ethnicity, they are built on implicit or explicit racism. According to Perry (2001) people try to maintain their privileged power positions through discriminatory action, violence or threats of verbal or physical violence.

These movements are not reaction to immigration alone. Stephen Castles and Alastair Castles and Davidson point out that the catalysts for extremist views and organisations are frequently fallen living standards and increasing insecurity caused by the speed of globalisation and economic restructuring. Social and economic turmoil resulting from these changes causes people to feel personally and culturally lost. Immigrants become the scapegoats for people’s frustrations (Castles & Davidson 2000).

White (1977) has pointed out that, in countries like France, Belgium, Austria, Canada and Australia, there are anti-minority political parties – polling between 10 and 15 percent of the national vote – pushing for the expulsion, not only of foreigners, but of recently naturalised immigrants. There are violent extremist groups like the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist groups in the United States and neo-Nazi organisations in European countries. Immigrants (Perry 2001), Jews, nonwhites and homosexuals are subjected to appalling abuse in many European countries. As the victims are often powerless to act, many crimes go unreported. Neo-Nazi groups often referred to as skinheads, are well organised and growing; they are part of a loose network that links far rights parties, “white power” rock music, and football hooligans.

These different types of ethnicity contribute, in various ways, to the yearnings of people for certitude as a result of ethnic violence in tumultuous fundamentalist and restorative post modernity. The most outstanding result of ethnicity is nationalism and ethnic cleansing.

Nationalism and Ethnic Cleansing

There is indeed a complex relationship between nationalism, ethnicity and ethnic cleansing. A *nation* is a group of people who have a common cultural inheritance and consider themselves a political community, and *nationalism* is a mythology that assumes the nation is the pivotal principle of political organisation (Heywood 1997). This is where historically a nation is different from an ethnic group. An ethnic group has a common identity and a feeling of cultural pride, but unlike a nation, it may not have collective aspirations for political autonomy. A nation may contain many ethnic groups, but all are expected to accept symbols of national unity (Edgar & Sedgwick 1999). If groups refuse a common identity, they will be discriminated against.

McIntosh (1999: 45) reports that “since the late 1960s, peoples such as Quebecois in Canada, Basques in Spain, Chechens in the Russian Federation, the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Croats in Bosnia Herzegovina, the Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Ibos in Nigeria, claim that ethnic and political boundaries must be congruent.” Other ethnic groups must be forced to leave the territory or suffer extreme discrimination: Hence, the expression “ethnic cleansing!” And in the understanding of Arbuckle (2004), ethnic cleansing is a form of vicious cultural bullying whereby an advancing army of one ethnic group expels other ethnic groups from towns and villages it conquers in order to create ethnically pure enclaves for members of their own group. Ethnic cleaning in Bosnia and Croatia in the former Yugoslavia has resulted in more than two million refugees and displaced persons, with over two hundred thousand civilians killed.

What also helps to cause violence and conflict in the world is the stand-off between ancient and modern, between conservatism and radicalism which result in New Religious Movement (NRM).

New Religious Movements and Violence

In the 1960s there was a general breakdown of tradition. The reason for this unfortunate occurrence was what Huntington (1998) described as a meaningless vacuum created by fundamentalist groups and controversial New Religious Movements (NRMs) variously called “sects” or “cults,” that proliferated at that time.

1. Sects and Cults

Arbuckle (2004) defines a sect as small, voluntary, exclusive religious groupings demanding total commitments from its followers, and stressing its separateness from and rejection of society. An example of this is the Unification Church, otherwise known as the Moonies. A cult, on the other hand, tends to be a more spontaneous and open movement, lacking specific membership requirements, offering particular concrete benefits to its members rather than the comprehensive worldviews and conceptions of salvation typical of religious sects. Udokang (2018), in recent research findings on Secret Cults Pandemonium in Nigeria has corroborated Arbuckle’s findings. There are also what Saliba (1999) refers to as political cults as in a group of people attached to a particular charismatic leader; religious cults, such as followers of Indian gurus, and self-improvement or therapy cults.

2. New Religious Movements (NRMs) and “The Cults.”

It is Beckford (1933) who succinctly describes New Religious Movement (NRM) and Cults. According to him, it is the religious movements following the expressive revolution were labeled by journalists and others pejoratively as “the cults,” for example, the Hare Krishna and Scientology are more accurately “sects” in the traditional sense described above because of their elitism and their vigorous efforts to make and retain converts. In recent years, because of the emotional connotations of the words “cult and “sects,” new, more neutral terms have been introduced to describe contemporary movements: “New Religious Movements,” “New Religious Groups,” “Alternative Religions.” How did New Religious Movement originate?

Origins of New Religious Movements

Melton (1965) takes us to the origin by stating that young people in the 1960s in the English-speaking world, disoriented by the consequences of the expressive revolution and mostly from fairly prosperous middle-class families, either rejoined the structures of society or accepted the competitive values and/or they enrolled in various New Religious Movements or in conservative Evangelical non-mainline Christian Churches.

The NRMs (including Evangelical Conservative Churches) offered a postmodern people what they most desired: experiential religion unencumbered with theological dogma, intimacy in community life; clarity of meaning and direction of life; therapeutic services – many in the drug culture wanted help that was understanding and non-judgmental (Vatican Report 1981). We now turn to New Religious Movement and Violence.

New Religious Movements and Violence

Quite a good number of people are of the opinion that new Religious Movement use of violence against members and outsiders. However, for Melton and Moore (1982), such generalizations are inappropriate, but rather there developed what has been called “the new bigotry” or a militant anti-cult movement. Modern mass communications, encouraged by politicians, Church people and legislators, began to scapegoat these movements, blaming them for all kinds of society’s illnesses.

The movements have been charged with brainwashing their followers so that they were never free to join or leave; while there are instances of serious coercion, e.g. in the mass suicide by members of the Peoples Temple in 1973. Barker (1984), submits that it is unfair to generalise. In her study of the Moonies, comments that people joined more often for rational reasons than because they were brainwashed. Sociologist John Saliba (1995, Melton & Bromly (1995) concludes that the “evidence adduced to support the tenet that new religious movements in general are destructive organisations that invariably ruin one’s life and warps ones personality is just not strong enough.”

What this means is that not all NRMs use bullying techniques; some in fact have achieved beneficial results for members (Appel 1983). That notwithstanding, violence and coercion against their members and society are endemic to some movements, for example, child and sexual abuse were pervasive in the Peoples Temple under the leadership of Kim Jones, and in the Branch Davidians, led by David Korech Wao, Texas

(Galanter (1998). Intimidating tactics by outside agencies can encourage leaders to be dictatorial in relating to members of the movements: in the face of an “enemy” they demand total loyalty to themselves. Federal government agents in the United States contributed through their confrontational style to the violent ending of the Branch Davidians. It seems this style also provoked Timothy McVeigh to destroy the federal office building in Oklahoma City in revenge against the federal government (Arnold 1987).

Fundamentalism, Violence and Terrorism

Patrick Arnold avers that fundamentalism is a historically recurring tendency within Judeo-Christian-Muslim religious traditions (Arnold 1987). Today, it occurs as authoritarian reaction to the fears of the chaos evoked by postmodernism and globalisation. In another place, Arnold (1990: 174) defines fundamentalism as

An aggressive and marginalized religious movement which is reaction to the perceived threat to modernity seeks to reform its home religion and nation to traditional orthodox principles: values and texts through the co-option of the central executive and legislative power of both the religion itself and the modern national state.

Toeing the same line of thought is Appleby (2000) who, however, introduces the notion of militancy: A specifiable pattern of religious militancy by which self-styled true believers attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community, and create viable alternatives to secular structures and processes. And for James Hunter, fundamentalism is a form of “organised anger” and all the fundamentalist groups “share the deep and worrisome sense that history has gone awry” (Hunter 1990: 174), the result of modernity and postmodernity.

Fundamentalists tend to form themselves into sects in the traditional sense described above, rather than cults. They believe that people in an established religious group have lost their original truth and zeal, so their task is to purify the group. If resistance is too great, fundamentalists may form a charismatic group. Fundamentalism in the Western world has generally tended to the middle class, whereas in India, Nigeria and Israel its mix of rationalism and religion has attracted people from all sections of society (Debundle 2005).

In Islamic countries fundamentalism has appeared as the mouthpiece for the oppressed and the marginalized and as the scourge of the decadent and materialist West (Laqueur (2001). Fundamentalist scapegoat objects, individuals or groups of people for the breakdown of “orthodoxy,” e.g. video machines, Hollywood, feminists demanding equality, card players. Modernity and post modernity in their many forms are the “Great Satan” for Islamic fundamentalists (Bruce 1990). In a reaction against the modernisation and secularization that the mullahs believe have corrupted the purity of Islam, Ayatollah Khomeini outlawed as “satanic” all those elements that symbolize corruption in Iran (Bruce 1990). Even Mohamedu Buhari of Nigeria seems to take the fundamentalist stance on corruption.

Fundamentalists and Terrorism

There is a relationship between fundamentalism and terrorism. Fundamentalists seek to co-opt the central executive and legislative power either through the democratic process or executive to extreme violence. and this is exemplified Boko Haram terrorist n North Eastern Nigeria.

In the United States fundamentalist Evangelicals were traditionally seen as “anti-political” soul-savers who waited for the second coming of Christ, wanted to live decent lives and be left alone, except when they would convert others (Bruce 1990). This dramatically changed in 1979 when Evangelical fundamentalist Jerry Falwell recognised that, “in spite of everything we are going to turn the nation back to God . . . the national crises is growing quickly out of hand” (Falwell 1967:358). Organised political action was seen as the only way to achieve the traditional aims of Evangelicals and fundamentalists. Falwell formed the Moral Majority, dominated by Protestant fundamentalists, but drawing together Protestant fundamentalists, Jews and Roman Catholics. Its platform was sharply focused pro-life, pro-traditional family/morality, pro-American, pro-national defense and pro-Israel.

At the same time, the New Right (Bruce 1990) emerged in the political scene as an ideological political with destructive values, a strong emphasis of maintaining the American way of life and America as the world’s capitalist superpower, and with clear-cut answers to contemporary social and economic challenges. Senator Barry Goldwater, an early leader of the New Right, could confidently declare that “extremism in defense of liberty is no vice” (Goldwater cited in White 1965). The Presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George Bush were deeply influenced by this political philosophy; for example, in their secret weapon sales to Iran and their undeclared war on the Nicaraguan government. President Bush, when he pardoned officials for their involvement in these activities, claimed that they had been inspired by patriotism that made their deeds pure (Sutherland 2000).

Violent Fundamentalists and Terrorism

Violence can range from manipulating facts and truths to physical assault on people and property. Fundamentalists who commit themselves to violence believe they are living in exceptional times that threaten their beliefs, and this permits them to suspend moral requirements jhy7of their religion, such as respect for human rights.

Toward the end of his life, Ayatollah Khomeini explained why fundamentalists are able to use terrorism even though this is normally against their religious beliefs. He claimed that since the very survival of the Islamic Republic of Iran was threatened, parts of the Islamic law governing it were to be bypassed in favour of the supreme jurist, i.e. Khomeini’s decision (Appleby 2000). In this way he justified the establishment of state terrorism in Iran and his support of Islamic terrorists in other parts of the world. Likewise the fundamentalist Taliban in Afghanistan and “pro-lifers’ who kill abortionists or blow up their buildings claim that exceptional times demand ruthless responses.

Political Terrorism

Political terrorism is “criminal behaviour designed primarily to generate fear in the community, or a substantial segment for political purposes” (Johnson 1982: 154). The primary motivation of terrorist organisations may be nationalist, for example, Basque Nationalism, the Irish Republican Army; ideological, for example the Red Brigade; or religious, for example

the Taliban, Humus, Hezbollah – the Lebanese Shiite movement. All have one thing in common, namely to create enough fear in the population to force governments to make desired political changes (Hoffman 1998). Terrorist movements have existed for centuries, sometimes involving thousands of members, but in recent times there has been a radical change in their character. Now, given the increasing availability of sophisticated technology, a small group or even one individual can terrorise thousands, even millions of people (Laquar 2002: 4-6, as cited in Arbuckle 2004).

Political terrorists have instrumental and primary targets. For example, in the case of the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon the primary target of the terrorists was the people of the United States; the Instrumental targets were the people trapped in the planes and buildings. Johnson (1982) has identified three strategic objectives of terrorism: a) to gain publicity of terrorist cause, b) to show that a government cannot protect the people, c) to force a government to overreact by turning the situation into a military one with the aim of so restricting a population's freedom that people will eventually turn against their government and impel it to submit to the terrorists' demands, d) to paralise and undermine a nation's economic infrastructure, even the global economy itself. The terrorist attack on the United States illustrates that this aim is now a real possibility.

Islamic Fundamentalism and Violence

Binyon (2001) has given a detailed representation of Islamic fundamentalism and violence. Following the bombings in New York and Washington in September 2001, there was rejoicing on the West Bank and in Palestinian refugee camps among the Taliban in Afghanistan and praise to Allah among Muslims in Pakistan and northern Nigeria, overwhelmingly among the poor and the dispossessed in the Muslim world. Some Westerners find this jubilation difficult to understand.

The Muslim people have an old and proud culture, but have long felt under attack from the West. Islamic radicalism draws its power from a deep sense of injustice. Since the early nineteenth century scarcely a decade passed without some Muslim area in Asia or Africa being threatened by Western Christian powers. There are efforts to build states in Islamic foundations – some radical, e.g. Iran, some less so, e.g. Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia (Binyon 2001).

Islamic fundamentalists (Sidahmed 2001) feel that so much has been destroyed by contact with the West: Qur'anic education, a sense of community, social coherence, the old religious legal system; above all, respect for ancient Muslim culture and values. Globalisation has intensified this feeling of lostness, e.g. the Internet's pornography, the atomization of families, the neglect of religious values. The West is blamed, but the United States in particular is seen as the "Great Satan" leading the destruction of all that is considered sacred. Political terrorism draws on this bitter resentment, and terrorists have a perverted hope that in the violent downfall of the "Great Satan" the world will be put right again.

As regards Afghanistan, the policies of the United States over the last twenty years have helped to create both Osama bin Laden and the fundamentalist Taliban regime that protect him (Mackenzie 2001). The idea of jihad or holy war, had almost stopped in the Islamic world after the tenth century but was revived, with American backing, in order to create pan-Islamic

movement following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The United States sent billions of dollars' worth of weaponry to groups fighting the Soviets. The aid succeeded and the Soviets were forced to withdraw, but the results are everywhere to be seen: huge supplies of arms, powerful local warlords and extreme religious zealotry. Now the *jihad* has been taken into Pakistan, to the unjust kingdoms of the Gulf, the repressive states of the southern Mediterranean, and to the West itself.

The uncomfortable truth for the West is that much of the contemporary hostility of fundamentalism in the Islamic world is as a result of its own past political failures resulting in violence and injustice for innocent people. Many of the world's most troubling problems have their root in decisions made at the treaty peace at Versailles in 1919 following the defeat of Germany. Among them are the creation of Burundi, Rwanda and Iraq, the instability of the Balkans, and above all, the feud between the Arabs and the Israelis (The Economist, 15th September 2001, p.59).

Similarly, in recent times, there are Palestinian exiles in refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan living in poverty and overwhelmed with a sense of hopelessness. Frustration is attracting growing numbers of refugees to Islamic extreme groups; violence in defense of their political and religious rights, these displaced refugees believe, is the only way out of their oppressive conditions (The Economist, 8th September 2001, p.51).

Catholic Restorationism and Fundamentalism

Pope St. John Paul II went all out to relate the faith to the positive aspects of the world (O'Malley, cited in Arbuckle 2004). The moral leadership of the Papacy reached its peak during this time. The Pope said emphatically that, "the council documents have lost nothing of their value and brilliance. They . . . [are] normative texts of the Magisterium. . . . We find a sure compass [in the council] by which to take our bearings in the century now beginning" (John Paul II 2001: 57). The Pope reiterates the fact that he is not a monarch and bishops are not his delegates: the whole bodies of Bishops . . . are also 'vicars and ambassadors of Christ.' The Bishop of Rome is a member of the College,' and the Bishops are his brothers in the ministry (John Paul II *Unum Sint*). This is notwithstanding the fact that there is a well-orchestrated attempt to restore the opposition-to-the-world mentality of the pre-Vatican II time and this is a powerful movement within the Catholic Church toward uncritical reaffirmation of pre-Vatican II structures and attitudes in reaction to the theological and cultural turmoil of the council and the modern world at large.

According to Arbuckle (2004) Restorationist movement includes Episcopal conferences and the bishops synod are structures established by Vatican II to express collegiality between papal Rome and local churches. However, their initiative and effectiveness have weakened. For example the Roman curia informed the Episcopal conferences of the United States that it did not have the authority to write a pastoral letter on peace. The bishop's synods have also lost their original authority intended by the council. A synod was "to demonstrate that all the bishops... share in the responsibility for the universal church." This collegial involvement by bishops has not been fully developed; at present its role is an advisory one (Arbuckle 1993).

Catholic Fundamentalism

This is a particular aggressive form of restoration. It is a concern for the danger of secular humanism - the assumed undermining of the religious heritage and purity of the church and nation through a conspiracy of liberals, media, government, and so-called leftists in theology and ecclesiastical administration.

2. It is an elitist assumption, as in all sects, of a kind of supernatural authority and the right to pursue and intolerantly condemn those who disagree with them.
3. It has highly selective approach to the church's teaching on ecclesiastical authority, private sexuality or incidental issues are obsessively emphasized, but the papal or Episcopal pronouncement on social question are ignored or considered matters for debate only.
4. It has a concern for accidentals, not for the substance of issues, e.g., the Lefebvre sect stresses Latin for the mass, failing to see that this does not pertain to authentic tradition.
5. it attempts to infiltrate government structure of the church in order to obtain legitimacy for their views and to impose them on the whole church.
6. And they vehemently attack with intolerance coreligionists.

Development of Catholic Fundamentalism

The belief of Fundamentalists is that secularist values found their way into the church through Vatican II in two ways, namely followers of the revolution supported increased aid for the poor, civil right, the rejection of the capitalist system, and antiwar rallies, and the relaxation of existing antiabortion and anti pornography law. Fundamentalists point to the "insidious" impact of the revolution's secular humanism in such document as the church in the modern world (Vatican II), the encyclical *Populorum Progressio* (1967). The thinking was that if the church became too closely allied with the poor it would lose support of the politically powerful, it was said, and where would it all end!(Arbuckle 2000)

Jesuit Fr. Thomas O'Meara defined Christian fundamentalism as "an interpretation of Christianity in which a charismatic leader locates with easy certitude in chosen words, doctrines and practices, the miraculous action of a strict God saving an elite from an evil world" (O'Meara 1990: 18) this is an apt description of catholic fundamentalism. Sects like Catholics United for the Faith(CUF) were formed to define the church against the "the loss of orthodoxy, "or the liberalizing excesses that Vatican II inspired the Latin Mass movement gave some catholic the nostalgic support they craved, and some eventually moved out of the church to join the Lefebvre sect. A wild variety of cult developed around supposed apparition of the mother of God and commonly their message was: the world is basically evil; return to traditional practices of the catholic faith; divine charismatic is imminent if the revelation are not listened to. In brief, the message was: return to the pre-Vatican II church or face dire consequences! The catholic charismatic renewal movement developed from within North America in 1967 and became one of the major movement of the 1970s. It is often fostered sect-like qualities contrary to Vatican II value, e.g. , opposition to social justice programs, elitism, fundamentalism with regard to the interpretation of the scripture, and authoritarian male leadership.

An example of Catholic Fundamentalist Movement is *Opus Dei*. Andrew Greeley views it as "a devious, antidemocratic, reactionary, semi-fascist institution, desperately hungry for absolute power in the church. It ought to be forced either to come out into the open or in the church. It ought to be forced either to come out into the open or be suppressed." It is

decidedly anti-Vatican II, not only because it has retained a Latin liturgy, but because it has uncritically supported rightwing political movement in Latin America and Asia, and capitalistic structure in the West. Its members claim that liberation theology, involvement in social justice issues, and the development of Basic Ecclesial Communities undermine the authority and secular power of the church.

Conclusion

From the above exposition, we can conclude that there is interconnectedness between Ethnicity, Fundamentalism, Restorationism in our postmodern world. They are so interconnected that none can be dealt with in isolation; to hurt one is to hurt the order. Each of them has connection with religion, and religion being a socio-cultural construct has a profound grip on man. These, indeed are reasons for the non-realisation of a violent-free world; such a world, for the moment is an unrealized dream. Undoubtedly ethnicity, fundamentalism and restorationism and accompanying violence are endemic in present day society and the conclusion is that the blood of ethnicity is thicker than the blood of dialogue and peace and all these societal anomalies will not go away in a hurry as long as the desire to protect one's fundamental religious identity and ethnic nationality is more than the desire for mutual coexistence.

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